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)lAS'S HEADQUARTERS, a Co-
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Defendants and Appellants . 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Trial Court, reserving for separate hearing 
the issue of damages (R. 16, 21), upon the prayer of 
plaintiff and respondent (R. 3) enjoined defendants 
and appellants from use of the trade name, "Al's 
Sporting Goods." On appeal, defendants and appel-
lants (hereafter called defendants) pray that this Court 
reverse the judgment below and remand to the Trial 
1 
Court with the direction to enter judgment of dismissal 
against plaintiff and respondent (hereafter called plain. 
tiff). Such direction will affect not only the inJ· unctio n, 
but also - because the merits are involved herein_ the 
reserved matter of damages. 
The evidence at trial was largely undisputed. 
Until on or about June 22, 1965, and for somt 
time prior thereto, plaintiff had been associated with 
the Salt Lake City retail business known as "Al's Sport-
ing Goods" - first, for a short time as the employee 
of its founder and his father-in-law, Almer R. Peterson 
' the "Al" of "Al's"; then, as a partner of Mr. Peterson; ' 
and after 1958, as its sole proprietor (R. 18, 19; Tr. 
49-51, 79 ;1 Ex. 3, 4, 13). In 1962, "Al's" location was 
changed from 134 West South Temple to 220 West 
South Temple, where it remained until it was closed 
(Tr. 49-50). 
During plaintiff's association with "Al's," it offered 
merchandise " ( f) or the sportsman - fishing tackle, 
hunting equipment, skiing equipment, anything that 
relates to sports" (Tr. 49). Such merchandise could be 
obtained at other locations (Tr. 52, 160). "Al's" also 
engaged in the repair of equipment (Tr. 51). The facili· 
ties at "Al's" last place of business under plaintiff were 
adapted to these business activities (Tr. 51) . 
Plaintiff testified that, during this time. his rela· 1 
1 All transcript references are to the red page numberds ;m~~ 
by the Clerk, rather than to the page numbers type Y 
Reporter. 
2 
tionship with customers "was more of a personal thing. 
These customers turned into friends as well as being 
l·ustomers"; also, that he would consult with them con-
('ernrnU' their needs (Tr. 52). Seven former customers 
. b 
1
,r plaintiff d/bla "Al's" testified substantially as fol-
'.oiis: 1. l) that plaintiff gave good advice, had a special 
rnowledge of the business, was courteous, and afforded 
lwn personalized service, or the like (Tr. 78-79, 81, 
~5. 88, 90,93, 96) ; ( 2) five of the seven had, at one 
tmie or another thought plaintiff's personal name was 
·Al" (Tr. 78-79, 82, 89, 90, 94, 96), but those five 
bad later learned that such personal name was "Dick" 
-a fact the other two had always known (Tr. 79, 
82. 88, 90, 94, 96) ; ( 3) one testified, and the others 
did not dispute, that the employees of plaintiff were 
also helpful (Tr. 86). 
The assistant manager of plaintiff d/b/a "Al's" 
at the time of trial testified concerning plaintiff's oper-
ation (Tr. 145-46). According to his testimony, during 
the period June 23, 1964 through June 23, 1965, plain-
tiff was in the store about fifty percent ( 50 % ) of the 
time, that he only acted as part of the sales force when 
' the other salesmen were busy, that he spent only about 
thirty-five percent ( 35 % ) of the time he was in the store 
on the floor, estimating that plaintiff spent on the floor 
of Al's Sporting Goods about fifteen percent (15%) of 
the time that the store was open. Further that plaintiff 
handled about fifteen percent (15%) of the customers 
who came into his store (Tr. 148-151). Further, that in 
addition to himself there were two other full-time and 
3 
one to three part-time employees (Tr. 148). Still further 
that plaintiff performed neither repairing1k)r instruction 
(Tr. 151-52). Finally, that he too - in plaintiff's ' 
presence - had from time to time been called "Ai' 1 
(Tr. 156). 
In rebuttal, plaintiff stated that, during the above 
indicated period, he had financial problems and "was 
out quite a bit trying to take care of these problems," 
but that '' (p) rior to that time I was in the store most 
of the time, and during the Christmas season and durinrr 
0 
the busy season, I was practically - there all the time.'' 
He specified his duties other than selling, consisting of 
purchasing, supervising stock and personnel, bookkeep· 1 
ing, arranging financing, and paying and collecting 
bills. When he was selling, e.g. during Christmas season, 
1964, plaintiff testified that he "sold as much or more , 
merchandise than any person in the store." Plaintiff 
stated, "However, this, you hire salesmen to do the 
selling." (Tr. 167-69.) 
During plaintiff's period of financial problems, 
in April, 1965, he met with defendants 'Volfe and Mc· 
Gillis who discussed the possibility that such defendants 
"pay off the creditors and it was suggested by .Mr. )-le-
Gillis possibly they would take half the business and ' 
I would get the other half" (Tr. 63; see also Tr. 115· 
118). 
Under date of June 22, 1965, plaintiff "doing busi· 
ness under the name of Al's Sporting Goods, as party 
4 
'ti fii·st part, assigned to Inter Mountain Association d 1e 
~r Credit )fen for the benefit of creditors: 
"'All and singular the goods, wares and mer-
diandise in the store and place of business of the 
said party of the first part situated at 220 'Vest 
South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah consisting 
of sporting goods and related merchandise to-
(rether with all fixtures, furniture, tools and ap-
pl.,nces used in carrying on said business, and 
equity therein and all book accounts and all books 
of account and bills receivable, notes and choses 
in action due or to become due, and all other 
chattels of every name, nature and description, 
wheresoever same may be found" (Ex. 1). 
Un cross-examination, plaintiff said of his intent: 
··:w1ell, I think the Assignment was general and I con-
reyed ev-erything or gave everything to them that 
, related to the business" (Tr. 61 ) . 
Plaintiff d/h/a "Al's" indebtedness at that time 
was approximately $175,000.00 to $180,000.00 (Tr. 62, 
13.3). Inter .Mountain, on June 28, 1965, appraised the 
furniture, fixtures and equipment of the store at 
~6,359.50 and the stock, at cost, at $58,254.33 (Ex. 25). 
All accounts receivable were encumbered (Tr. 62). 
After this time, defendant Wolfe - in line with 
the prior negotiations between defendants and plaintiff 
, - called plaintiff and asked if he and defendant l\Ic-
' Gillis could talk to him again. Plaintiff answered affirm-
' atirely. In the conference that ensued, plaintiff advised 
' that he was "all through with this deal," that he had 
5 
"made an Assignment to the Association of Credit 
Men," and that" (a) 11 I want to do is get out and be out •. 
of this pressure and leave this business" (Tr. 118 
1 
Defendants told plaintiff at that time that "in tl~; 
particular case now, if they bought it it would be their~ 
which to me indicated to me I was out in other words'' 
(Tr. 64). 
Plaintiff turned over the keys to "Al's" to the 
Inter Mountain Association, and left (Tr. 54). 
Under date of July 6, 1965, plaintiff's assignee 
for the benefit of creditors caused to be circulated z 
Notice of Sale. After listing separately the respectin 
valuation above specified of merchandise inventory a: 
cost and of fixtures at appraised value, the notice staterJ 
that "bids will be accepted for all assets or separate 
offers on the merchandise or fixtures," but that ''(w)e' 
... reserve the right to reject any and all bids" (Ex.19). 
In the name of defendant Wolfe's Sportsman's 
Headquarters in which he was a partner (Tr. 113), 
defendant \Volfe submitted a bid of $36,428.00 for the 
combined merchandise, inventory and fixtures of "Al's 
Sporting Goods" (Ex. 20). 
On two occasions prior to the opening of bids, plain· 
tiff approached defendant Wolfe to discuss "Al's" 
(Tr. 64, 122). On the first, plaintiff indicated that he 
was available to work at "Al's" if defendants were the 
successful bidders (Tr. 122-23) . On the second - the 
morning of the bid opening, plaintiff stated that he 
discussed with defendant Wolfe - assuming he were 
6 
I Cc
essful bidder - "the probability of being in 
tie SU • • 
business with him at Al's Sportmg Goods and workmg it ) 
:lown there because I felt I could bring a business in" 
it 
). 
IS 
'S 
1 Tr. 6.J.-65). Defendant \Volfe's testimony as to the 
second meeting was that plaintiff "said he was avail-
able, that he needs a job and if we were bidders and so 
en _ successful bidders, he would like to go to work 
there and told me how much he sold and so on and so 
forth, and I said, well, we will see what happens" (Tr. 
1ZZ-Z3). At this time, defendant 'Volfe did not know 
1rhat he was going to do - whether to take the merchan-
fae to \\'olfe's Sportsman's Headquarters or to open 
up· Al's Sporting Goods" (Tr. 126). 
At the bid opening, the 'Volfe's bid was high 
(R. 18). Pursuant thereto, plaintiff's assignee delivered 
, to defendant \Yolfe's Sportsman's Headquarters a bill 
of sale to " (a) II furniture, fixtures and merchandise as 
\ per inYentory list attached hereto and made a part here-
, of" (Ex. 9, 25), and delivered to defendant \Volf e the 
kerto the business location (Tr. 124). When defendants 
1. took possession of the location, left with the merchan-
dise and inventory were the sales tickets, envelopes, 
paper sacks and other printed items used to operate 
a place of business, as well as trademark forms used 
for advertising purposes. Defendants used these items 
and the cash register, a part of the fixtures, which 
printed on each cash slip the trade name "Al's Sporting 
Uoods." Also imprinted with the trade name were pur-
chase agreements, ski wax, and metal and cloth labels. 
!Tr. 55, 68, 69, 160-63; Ex. 21-25.) 
7 
On or before July 17, 1965 defendants reopened 
"Al's Sporting Goods" (Tr. 146) . Two persons who 
had worked for plaintiff before he terminated the busi-
ness were employed there. Ads were being placed similar 1 
to the advertising which had been undertaken by plain-
tiff before he terminated business (Tr. 56-57; Ex. 
14-17). 
Under date of July 20, 1965, plaintiff through his 
agent and attorney, Mr. Fowler, demanded that defen-
dants cease their use of the trade name "Al's Sporting 
Goods" in that it was not intended that such tradt 
name be included within the assignment for the benefit 
of creditors (Ex. 8) . 
Also, at or about this time, defendant .McGilfo 
attempted to purchase such rights as plaintiff retained 
to the name (Tr. 59, 65-66, 127-29). 
Under date of July 28, 1965, Inter .Mountain 
assigned to defendant Wolfe such rights to the trade 
name as it had acquired by reason of the assignment 
from plaintiff (Ex. 10). 
At the time of the trial, defendants d/b/a "Al's 
Sporting Goods" were conducting a "going out of busi· 
ness" sale with an eye to termination prior to January 1, 
1966 (Tr. 57, 165; Ex. 14-15). 
8 
ARGUlHENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF DOES NOT OWN THE 
TRADE NA:\iIE "AL'S SPORTING GOODS" 
AXD, HENCE, HAS NO GROUNDS UPON 
\\'HICH HE ~IA Y PROPERLY CO.MPLAIN 
OF ITS USE BY DEFENDANTS. 
A. Plaintiff must recover on the strength of his title. 
It is hornbook law that one, to enjoin the use of a 
trade name by another, must establish his ownership 
uf that name, 52 Am. Jur., Trademarks, Tradenames, 
n11d Trade Practices § 148 .. l\Iore particularly, "(t)he 
11ght of one who sells a business to prevent the pur-
drnser from using the old tradename depends on the 
extent of property right transferred by the contract of 
' mle,'' id. at p. 625. Proof of his title to the name "Al's 
Sporting Goods" was, thus, the very root of plaintiff's 
burden of proof . 
. Although asked to do so by plaintiff ( R. 2) and 
, although the basis of each issue framed by the Pretrial 
Order (R. 14), the Trial Court made no finding or 
conclusion that, at the time of filing the complaint or 
of the hearing herein plaintiff had such title ( R. 18-21). 
Absent such a finding or conclusion, the injunction was 
issued erroneously. In fact, as a matter of law, it must 
lie concluded that - at such times - plaintiff had no 
surh title, on the strength of which he could rely or, 
lience, on which injunctive or other relief could be pre-
mised. 
9 
B. Plaintiff divested himself of title to the trade 
narne 
by his assignment to the Inter Mountain Association of Credit 
Men. 
1. The terms of the Assignment eff ccted the tran~- ) 
fer of the trade name. 
The assignment for the benefit of creditors from 
plaintiff to Inter Mountain Association of Credit Men 
did not reserve the trade name, but rather conveyed, in 
the most sweeping language: 
"All and singular the goods, wares and mer· 
chandise in the store and place of business fJ! 
the said party of the first part, situated at 2211 
West South Temple, Salt Lake City, Ctah, co11-
sisting of sporting goods and related merchandise 
together with all fixtures, furniture, tools and 
appliances used in carrying on said business, and 
equity therein and all book accounts and all books 
of account and bills receivable, notes and choses 
in action due or to become due, and all other 
chattels of every name, nature and description, 
wheresoever same may be found." (Emphasis ' 
supplied.) (Ex. I.) 
Such language has uniformly been held to transfer 
trade names. 
In Dr. S. A. Richmond N ervine Company v. Rich· 
mond, 159 U.S. 293, 296 (1895) an assignment for the 1 
benefit of creditors of "all property" carried with it a 
trademark which included the assignor corporation's 
president's photograph and name. In Hegeman~ Co. 
v. Hegeman, 8 Daley l (N.Y. Common Pleas, 1880) 
an assignment for the benefit of creditors of "all choses 1 
10 
. t·on" and "all property and effects, of every nature 
ill ac 1 < 
and Jescription of ,vhatever name or nature" carried 
irith it the trade name "Hegeman & Co." In Bank of 
Tomah v. TFarren, 94 'Vis. 151, 68 N.W. 549 (1896) 
. 'tssi'rrnment for the benefit of creditors of "all and 
all ' b 
singular" the assignor's "lands, tenements, heredita-
wents, appurtenances, goods, chattels, stock, accounts, 
promissory notes, bonds, bills, debts, choses in action, 
claims, demands, property, and effects of every kind 
md description" empowered the assignee to sell the 
building, fixtures, good will and the name of the 'Bank 
of Tomah'." 
Here, too, the language is that of a general assign-
ment for the benefit of creditors. The rule for such an 
assignmeut is stated in the annotation on the subject 
found at -1!4< A.L.R. 700: 
"A trade mark or tradename which is not per-
sonal in its nature constitutes a part of the assets 
of the estate of an insolvent, and is treated as 
such in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings 
and on an assignment for the benefit of creditors. 
The right to use a trade mark or tradename which 
is assignable will pass on a general assignment in 
such proceedings, even though it is not specif-
ically mentioned therein; and one who purchases 
the assets of the insolvent gains the same right in 
respect to it that the latter had." (Emphasis sup-
plied.) 
It is noteworthy that the Utah statute respecting 
assignments for the benefit of creditors specifies that 
the i1wentory annexed to the assignment "shall not be 
11 
conclusive as to the amount of the debtor's estate, and 
such assignment shall vest in the assignee the title to 
an11 
other property belonging to the debtor at the time ~f 
making the assignment, except property exempt froni 
execution and insurance upon the life of the assign. 
or .... " (Emphasis supplied), 6-1-3 U.C.A., 1953. 
Were there any question of the literal adequacr 
of the assignment to divest plaintiff of the trade nam;, 
the law would accomplish the same end, for it is well 
established - under the authorities collected at Point Il 
C hereinafter - that the sale or assignment of the 
tangible assets of a business automatically carries with 
it the trade name of that business. The basis for this :s 
apparent. It is sound public policy to encourage assign· 
ments for the benefit of creditors. They do not involve 
the coercion attendant to bankruptcy. They do afford 
a means for the debtor to shed his debts through pro rata 
payments. 
Creditors should be encouraged to enter into such 
assignments. They can best be encouraged if they are 
assured that all non-exempt assets pass. That way their 
pro ra ta return is higher, and the general acceptabiliry· 
of the mechanism is enhanced. 
2. The trade name, "Ats Sporting Goods" does not 
come within the exception from transfer for pers()71ai 
names and marks. 
a. In that plaintiff's personal name was not n 
part of the trade name, such trade name 
could not be "per.wnal." 
12 
Plaintiff does not come within the exception to the 
.tde noted in the citation from 44 A.L.R. 706, supra. 
i l that some, but not all, "personal" names and marks 
r1
1
, not pass to the assignee of the business with which 
ilJe\' are cunnected.2 It should be noted, in order to 
ret~in perspective, that the question of whether a trade 
!l;Une is "personal" is not restricted to insolvency or in-
i~Jluntary transfer law. The selfsame inquiry is presented 
,11 .\II attempted volitional assignment, for the owner of 
·11crsonal'' trade name cannot assign it voluntarily, 
.'ten for a cunsideration, 87 C.J.S., Trade Marks, Trade 
,\11 mes and Unfair Competition,§ 171 at p. 503. Indeed, 
'hc. only case which - on its facts and in its result -
attords even passing substance to plaintiff's position, 
Jfesser v. 11he Fadettes, 168 Mass. 140, 46 N.E. 407 
11897) involved an attempted voluntary (not insolv-
ency) assignment of a trade name which was denomi-
nated non-transferable because, inter alia, "personal." 
Thus, while insolvency case_s in which the "personal" vs. 
·impersonal" dichotomy arises sometimes contain highly 
charged dictum - e.g. the verbiage of Mattingly v. 
Stone, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 72, 12 S.W. 467, 14 S.,V. 47 
: 1889) that a trade name "remain ( s) to the bankrupt 
:is his capital for a new beginning" - the basic question 
1Jf whether a given trade name is "personal" is not the 
special preserve of insolvents and the law applicable to 
'.hem. Nor, therefore, is the "personal name" exception 
n the product of judiciary sympathy for the insolvent who 
!/ 
. ~~e also 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assignments for Benefit of Creditors, 
•• J, 
13 
- having rid himself of his obligations - seeks tort· e a111 
his assets. 3 In other words, the inquiry here presented is 
precisely the same as if plaintiff had purported to 
11 se 
voluntarily his business and trade name to a third par\\ 
and then asserted the trade name did not pass becau;e 
it was "personal" to him. 
The answer to that inquiry is that the trade rwmf 
"Al's Sporting Goods" was not personal to plaintiff /
11 
that a trade name - to be "personal" must contain tlie 
personal name of its owner - not the case here - anJ 
may not even be "personal" then. With the single and 
readily distinguishable exception of Messer v. The Fad 
ettes, supra, all case authorities espouse this proposition. 
The test outlined at Anno., 44 A.L.R. 706, supr:1. 
and adopted by the cases, is two-fold: 
I. Any trade name which does not contain its oll'n· 
er's own name is impersonal. 
2. Any trade name which contains the person's own 
name is nevertheless impersonal if it has come to signify 
a particular grade or variety of goods or a particular 
place, rather than that person's own skill in the care. 
selection and production of goods. 
The second element of the exception is, in the 
main, a question off act, 44 A.L.R. 172. The Trial Court 
found no such fact in the case at bar. 
3 In fact, to the extent the peculiarities of insolvency law play a 
role herein they favor defendants, for there is a judicial I?resumfij 
tion that an assignor for the benefit of creditors has ass11g~d 404 non-exempt assets, Willmer v. Thomas, 74 Md. 485, 22 A. • 
(1891). 
14 
IS 
Plaintiff in this case would eliminate the first part 
f the formula, and assert that an,ij trade name which 
'.'.ould be shown to represent to any of the public the skill 
of ib owner is "personal,'' a result which would seriously 
alter both inso!Yency law aHd the law of voluntary trade 
name assignments. 
The cases which recognize and define the exception 
are gathered at H A.L.R. 711. Save Messer v. The 
Fodcttt's. <;upra, and 1Vard-Chandler Bldg. v. Caldwell, 
8 Cal. .lpp. :2d 375, -J.7 P.:2d 758 ( 1935), no pertinent 
rlerisio11 supplementary of, or subsequent to, the anno-
tation Jin~ been found. Each decision so collected makes 
it cJLllte dear that a trade name which is wholly fictitious 
in that it embraces the name of someone other than the 
;1;s1gnor is not exempt from passage under a general 
as~ignment of the physical business with which it is con-
nected. 
Prior to direct discussion of the decisions in ques-
tion, 1t will promote their understanding to examine 
their basis. EYery man has a right to conduct his own 
business in his own name. It is hornbook law, therefore, 
that "a charge of infringement or unfair competition 
cannot be predicated upon the bona fide and innocent 
use by an indiYidual of his own name in his own business, 
eren though such use may incidentally interfere with 
or injure the business of another person or organization 
ufthesame or similar name," 52 Arn . .Tur., Trademarks, 
Trode11a111cs and Trade Practices § 133. 
As a eorrolary, the eourts have adopted the rule that 
15 
an insolvency proceeding or voluntary assignment can. 
not deprive a man of that right to use his own nam · e l!l 
his own business. It is that principle and no other, wlucli 
the exception under examination embraces. 
The pertinent decisions are: 
(1) 
Children's Bootery v. Sutker, 91 }..,la. 60, 107 Su. 
345 (1926). 
The decision is entirely in point here. In 1920, 
Sawilowsky entered the children's shoe, stocking and 
accessories business at ll5 J\'Iain Street, Jacksonville, 
adopting the trade name "The Children's Bootery." On 
August 17, 1922, he was adjudicated an involuntar)' 
bankrupt. The proceeding identified the bankrupt as 
"Samuel Sawilowsky, trading as Children's Bootery." 
Thereafter, at bankruptcy sale, Sutker bought all of 
the assets, including the good will and trade name, of 
the business and, on September 20, 1922, reopened the 
store, continuing to use the trade name "The Children's 
Bootery." 
Thereafter, Sawilowsky and two associates, formed 
a corporation named "The Children's Bootery" and, 
under that name, opened up business at 105 Main Street, 
Jacksonville. Not unlike the plaintiff herein, Sawilowsky 
sought to avoid the negative effects of his insolvency 
proceedings while reaping the rewards of the divestiture 
of debt. Like plaintiff herein, Sawilowsky's corporation 
brought suit against Sutker to enjoin him from using 
16 
I t ade 
name although he had purchased it from 
tie r ' 
~awilowsky ·s trustee. 
Xot only did Sawilowsky fail in his attempt to 
·11 Sutker · he, his corporation and his associates dl)Ul '- ' 
11~re tJiemseI-res enjoined from use of the trade name. 
Although such good will as the business had and as \vas 
:ittachecl to its trade name, was the result of Sawilow-
1n's management prior to his bankruptcy, a point plain-
titl' in the case at bar pressed at trial, the Florida Su-
preme Court, taking note of the exception afforded some 
·personal' names in insolvency proceedings, said "the 
trade-name now under consideration is not a personal 
1Jllt, nnd we are not here concerned with such limitation." 
(2) 
Iov::a Seed Co. v. Dorr, 70 Iowa 481, 30 N.,V. 866 
11886). 
This is a decision which invokes the "personal" 
name exception. C. ,V. Dorr & Co., a seed growing 
concern, made an assignment for the benefit of creditors. 
The plaintiff purchased the business from Dorr's as-
1ignee. Later Dorr organized another seed growing 
concern, also named C. ,V. Dorr & Co. Plaintiff's prayer 
for an injunction prohibiting the use by Dorr of his 
rery own name was denied. 
The reasons for the denial are instructive. In the 
first place, at 30 N.YV. 868, the Iowa Supreme Court 
stressed that "C. 'V. Dorr clearly has the right to go 
mto business in his own name. " It also noted that 
17 
seed growing involved personal skill. Therefore, both 
tests for application of the personal name exception 
had been met: (I) Dorr's personal name was involred 
and ( 2) the resultant trade name indicated personai 
capability rather than a particular place or a particular . 
grade or variety of goods. 
(3) 
Mattingly v. Stone, supra. 
This decision also invokes the "personal" namt 
exception. Subsequent to his bankruptcy, Stone, a whis· 
key distiller, entered into a contract in which the sole ' 
consideration passing from him was a trademark he; 
had owned prior to his bankruptcy. The trademark was ' 
"Old W. S. Stone Distillery; M.P.1\-1., Distiller. Hand 
made, sour mash whiskey." The buyers sought to rescind· 
the contract for lack of consideration, asserting that the 
bankruptcy proceedings had taken the trademark from. 
Stone and that, therefore, it was not his to pass on. 
Rejecting rescission, the court held at 12 S.,V. 469: 
"It will be noticed that the words composing 
the brand, save the name of the appellee, are 
those of common use; and the right of using his 
name was a personal one to the appellee, and did 
not, therefore, pass to his assignee any more than 
would the skill acquired by a merchant from 
experience in his business." (Emphasis supplied.) 
On rehearing, the court held at 14 S.,V. 48: 
"A trade-mark proper is of value, and a su?ject ·. 
of commerce. It therefore passes to the assignee 
18 
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of a bankrupt owner. But a distinction is to be 
taken, it seems to us, between such a case and 
the use of a person's name, merely, which may 
be -raluable on account of his honesty and skill." 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
Here again, Stone's own name was involved. Here 
:~:iin, the resultant trade mark indicated personal cap-
:uilitr rather than a particular place or a particular 
,ra<le ,w rnriety of goods. Both elements being met, the 
·per~onal" name exception was applied. 
(4) 
Warren v. Warren Thread Co., 134 Mass. 247 
he ; (1883). 
as This clecision is primarily interesting because it 
1d illustrates that it is not enough that a trade name or 
id' trademark bear the complaining insolvent's own name, 
he out also that it not have significance solely as a particular 
m place or a particular grade or variety of goods. 'V arren 
attempted to enjoin his assignee for the benefit of credi-
9: 
ig 
re 
llS 
id 
tors, operating the business which was formerly his, 
from using trademarks previously belonging to him. 
1\'arren's name appeared upon one of them. Despite 
this, the Supreme Judicial Court of :Massachusetts 
refused the injunction even as to it, stating at 134 Mass. 
ID 247--1!8: 
Ill 
.) "It is apparent upon inspection that these are 
not mere personal trade-marks, the use of which 
by any other person than the plaintiff would 
operate as a fraud upon the public. His name 
does not appear upon any of them except one, 
19 
and in that it is a subo~dinate part of the trade-
mark. They are all designs or symbols designat-
ing the place or the establishment at which tl threa~ is manufactur_ed,. and not implying an\e 
peculiar personal_ skill _m the plaintiff as tl;t 
manufacturer, or unportmg necessarily that it j, 
manufactured by him." · 
The Warren decision, thus, is of a kind with Dr. 
S. A. Richmond N ervine Co. v. Richmond, supra. and 
others cited at 44 A.L.R. 713. If we were here dealinr, 
' with "Dick's Sporting Goods" or "Peeples' Sporting 
Goods," say, it would impose upon plaintiff the hurdt11 
to show that the name connoted to the public his par· 
ticular skills rather than a place or a class of goods, wert 
it not to have passed to Inter l\'Iountain along witl1 
the business to which it was attached. "\Ve are not, (If 
course, here dealing with "Dick's" or with "Peeples'": 
Warr en's import herein is, therefore, in demonstrating 
what plaintiff had to prove if he could first prove that 
his own name was part of the trade name in question. 
(5) 
Hembold v. Henry T. Hembold Mfg. Co., 53 How. 
Pr. 453 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1877). 
The language of this case is expressive of the pur· 
pose and nature of the exception accorded, under some 
circumstances, the personal name of an insolvent. 
Rembold owned the trademark "H. T. Hembold's 
Highly Concentrated Compound Fluid Extract of 
Buchu." The purchaser of that trademark at his sub· 
20 
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t bankruptcy sale, sought to enJOlll him from 1equen 
t Sl
.ng the mark. Relying on cases about the right bCT~ . . . 
• 11ari to use his own name m his own busmess -ot a 1 
d notma in the manner of Mattingly v. Stone, supra, :lll ei' 
tJia;: the remainder of the mark was merely descriptive 
__ the court refused the injunction, stating at 53 How. 
Pr. 4oO: 
''The name of Henry T. Rembold must still 
belong to him, to whom his parents gave it. No 
law and no court can take it from him. The prop-
erty which he had acquired belongs to his credi-
tor~, but the name and whatever of character, 
good or bad, belong to it, and which he has him-
self made, are his, and must so continue to be 
until he voluntarily parts with them. He has the 
right to make any extract he pleases, and to tell 
the public by the use of his own name that the 
preparation is his, and not that of another, and 
neither the plaintiff nor any other person can 
place that name upon a preparation not his, 
against his will, and deprive him of the use there-
of. Such act would not only impose upon others, 
but would also be so cruel and outrageous to-
ward him that, as it seems to me, no law and no 
court could justify it." 
Likewise, the name of Richard C. Peeples, despite 
Ills insolvency, must still belong to him, to whom his 
parents gave it. But it is not his own name that he seeks 
to protect herein. It is that of another person with whom 
he wab once associated. He cannot appropriate that 
altogether different name in such a manner that in in-
' 
solrency proceedings, it will not pass to his creditors. 
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(6) 
Hegeman q; Co. v. Hcyc11wn, supra. 
This case is especially in point. The plaintiff joiuerJ 
his father in a pharmacy business run previously by ti" 
father. It was styled "Hegeman & Co." Shortly tiiere' . 
after, the father died. The son encountered financial rlit'. 
:ficulties and executed a general assignment for the bene-
fit of the creditors. The assignee sold the name alotig 
with all other assets to defendant's predecessor. Tlte 
plaintiff sued to enjoin the use of the name. 
The court refused to grant the injunction. It 11 m 
held that the trade name acquired its value under, an2 
was "personal" to, the father, who was dead, and was i 
not "personal" to the son. The court noted that, in the ! 
exercise of his right to use his own name, the son could 1 
organize a pharmacy named "Hegeman & Co.," but 
could not represent that it was the successor of the 
1 
former concern. That representation could, howeYer, be 1 
made by the purchaser from the assignee. 
It will be perceived that the holding establishes tbm 
a name "personal" to one is not therefore "personal" to 
an associate succeeding him, a principle directly incon· 
sistent with plaintiff's apparent position herein. In 
Hegeman, to reach this result - since both father and . 
son were named Hegeman - it was necessary to hol<l 
that the trade name was a reflection of personal skill ol 
the father, but merely descriptive of a particular place• 
or of a particular grade or variety of goods as regards 
the son. In the case at bar, the second factor is not 
22 
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l d The names of Almer R. Peterson and Richard reac ie . 
, Peeples are not the same - not even remotely so. ~'betrade name which was "personal" to Peterson, being 
I. i·n does not, not being Peeples' own, become so to JIS 0\ ' 
Peeples through his prior association with Peterson. 
(7) 
Matter of Swezey, 62 How. Pr. 215 (N.Y. Com-
mon Pleas, 1881), affirmed in part, IO Daley 107 (Ct. 
r,f Common Pleas. 1882) . 
Had the decision of the lower court in Swezey not 
been appealed, it would have afforded authority for 
plamtiff. Having been appealed, it further fortifies the 
position of defendants. Defendants herein have sub-
mitted that, in order for an insolvent to retain a trade 
name or trademark despite a general assignment for the 
benefit of creditors of the business to which that name 
the 
1 attached, the insolvent must demonstrate two things to 
, be I 
' to 
·on· 
In 
rnd 
1ol<l 
!ol 
make that name or mark "personal," hence exempt from 
the assignment. They are: (I) that the person's own 
name is involved; and ( 2) that the resultant trade name 
or trademark has not come to connote a particular 
place or a particular grade or variety of goods. The 
theory of plaintiff's argument has been (although the 
Trial Court did not find nor conclude) that the dis-
junctive "or," rather tha1\.the conjunctive "and" should 
be used. In that way, he can attempt to raise a question 
ace· of fact centering around the second factor, even though 
rds the first is not here satisfied. Both findings must, bv 
not law, be present to permit the exception, not just on;. 
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In Swezey, creditors under a general assignment 
for their benefit requested the trial court to order lht 
assignor into court to show cause why he continued tr, 
use the trademark "Peerless" on carpet wraps as he hau 
done prior to the assignment. The court granted that 
order. It went further, however, and in the order drafter! 
specified that an area of inquiry would be whether tllf 
trademark "Peerless" had come to connote the ski!J 01 
Swezey, rather than a particular grade or variety of 
goods. If it had, he opined, Swezey would retain it u.1 
"personal." If not, it would have passed for the benetil 
of such creditors. 
In a terse opinion on appeal, the appellate court of ·. 
Common Pleas mandated the language in question: 
stricken from the order, characterizing it as "entirel.r 
too broad." Indeed it was, for it overlooked entirely the 
important first factor: that the trade name or trademar~ 
must involve the insolvent's own name. 
Subsequent to the action of the appellate court in · 
Swezey, in disallowing the same, no court has alloweJ 
an insolvent to exempt from insolvency proceedings a 1 
trademark or trade name adhering to his business and 
not involving his own name. 
(8) 
Bellows v. Bellows, 24 Misc. 482, 53 N.Y.S. 853 o 
( 1898) ; Lowell Lamb ~ Co., Inc., 204 App. Div. 40i .. n 
198 N.Y.S. 55 (1923) appeal dismissed, 238 N.Y. 57Z. 
144 N.E. 897 (1924). 
24 
ient These decisions, which can be treated together, are 
lht dearly within the rules hereinbefore enunciated. In the 
l tr, tirsl, a general assignment for the benefit of creditors 
hau was held not to have precluded Charles Bellows from 
hat the right "to use his own name." In the latter, a trade-
'te1J mark consisting of a walking animal and the slogan 
tllf We are going to Lowell Lamb to be assorted, where 
u1 ,1un·alue will be appreciated" did not pass ._.in an 
of msolvency proceeding in that: (I) it involved his own 
u.1 name: and (2) it referred to his personal skill in grading 
etil and sorting furs. 
Neither case assists plaintiff. Both cases fall square-
of • Ir within the ambit of the rules of law exposited by 
ion · defendant. 
~l,r 
he 
.r~ 
(9) 
Cuttwell v. Lye, 17 Ves. Jr. 336, 34 Eng. Reprint 
129 (1810). 
in· 
This decision confirmed the right of the insolvent 
eJ 
to use the same trade route after insolvency that he had 
1d 
used before. This is in line with the established law in 
this nation that insolvency proceedings do not bar the 
insolvent from returning to his business or profession. 
Amechanic, for instance, may go through bankruptcy, 
and still remain a mechanic. Nobody disputes the right 
13 of plaintiff herein to return to the sporting goods busi-
i, . ness- just as nobody disputed the right of Sawilowsky 
Z. 10 return to the children's shoeware and stocking busi-
ness. The dispute, as in Children's Bootery, is over the 
25 
right of the insolvent to enjoin the use of the trade , 
lldDk 
attached to his former business establishment. · 
(10) 
Cotton v. Gillard, 4<:1< L.J. Ch. N.S. 90 087h 
This decision stands for the proposition that a tra
1
1
1 
name or trademark cannot exist in gross, i.e. iwlepeti 
dently of the business to which it is affixed. Thus, 
J\iaster of the Rolls held that the trade name identirie,: 
with a sauce recipe did not pass to the trustee in ba11\ 
ruptcy of a person who was not the owner of such recin1. 
( 11) 
Ward-Chandler Bldg. Co. v. Caldwell, supra. 
The question raised by paragraph III of the com· 
F 
plaint is whether a trade name, once "personal," can g 
become "impersonal." II egeman v. Hegeman, supra, ti 
answered the question in the affirmative, i.e. in defen· 
0 
dants' favor. So also, in a fact situation more akin totl1t tr 
one here present, does Ward-Chandler Bldg. Co. 1 
At one time, persons named Hudgen conducterl rr 
a business under the trade name "Hudgen's Permanent tl 
'\Vave Shop." They thereafter sold the business, incluJ· 
ing the name, to Caldwell. Caldwell, in turn, sold tit· cc 
business and name to Goodman. In speaking of til: pt 
effect of these conveyances and transfers, the court saiJ 
"Originally, the trade-mark which is the sul:· th 
ject ~f this lit~g:~tio~ was, presumably,, a pe~·son1'.: b~ one, m that it md1cated to the public that L, 
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personal care and ~kill of the Hudgens w~re 
exercised in producmg the goods or rendermg 
the services sold. lly the sale of the business and 
the trade-mark the latter had become impersonal, 
indicating merely that the business was the same 
one which had for some time been carried on 
under that name." 
That, of course, is the case here. While the name 
Al's Sporting Goods" may have, during his lifetime, 
indicated to the public the personal care and skill of 
Almer R. Peterson, it became impersonal as a matter of 
Jn\\' when purchased by the plaintiff. 
(12} 
Messer v. The /l'adettes, supra. 
The Messer decision, as noted previously, affords 
Ji· plaintiff the only final decision containing judicial lan-
311 guage in any way favorable to his position. It concerned 
ra. the sale to Messer by one Ethel Atwood, who had 
:n· organized the group, of all her "right, title, and interest 
\1: in and to the organization known as the "Fadette 
Ladies' Orchestra,' ... together with all rights acquired 
le1  in and to the establishment, name, and trademark m 
eni the words of 'Fadette Ladies Orchestra'." 
The orchestra members were not parties to the 
ti1 
contract of sale. The buyer sought to enjoin them from 
lnt 
performing under the name "The Fadettes." 
1iJ 
The court in denying relief held, quite properly, u~ 
ini that the musicians employed by Miss Atwood "could not, 
th by her contract of sale, be put in the control of any other 
27 
person, and there was nothing in her relation to ti 
ltn1 
that she could convey." The Thirteenth Amendment lri a 
the Federal Constitution demanded as much. 
Cl 
But what of the trade name? Even if that whicli 
it signified could not be transferred legally, could it bt sl 
effectively assigned in gross. l\!Iodern jurisprudenct SJ 
would answer no, on the basis of authorities collected :rt rt 
\\' Point II C hereinafter, and that would settle the matte1. 
tl1 
In fact, Messer has been cited by this Federal Circuit 
+h 
(in a case arising in Colorado before creation nf the 
to 
Tenth Circuit) for the proposition that a trade namt 
cannot exist apart from the business with which it i1 : 
connected, Everett 0. Fisk~ Co., Inc. v. Fisk Te1u:her's, th 
Agency, Inc., 3 F.2d 7, 8 ( 1924). Considered in this 
!01 
light, the Messer result was undoubtedly correct. ~fos r 
Atwood could not effectively assign a trade name in· ~l 
dependent of the business with which it was connected, : be 
and her attempted assignment of that business was. rei 
illegal. Her attempted trade name assignment, being in; ow 
gross, was thus equally illegal. fie
1 
The court said, however, " ( s) o far as Ethel Atwood 
had any right or ownership in the tradename whicl1 th( 
designated the organization under her management, it llil' 
was personal to herself, depending upon her personal sur 
reputation and skill, and it was not assignable" (em· poi 
phasis supp lied) . That, standing alone and cited on not 
a point on which well-established precedent against dee 
· · on tio1 assignments in gross was already determmative, c · 
stitutes the sole language to which plaintiff can point on( 
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theni That language is not determinative here. "\Vere it, 
. · g' as it did in a voluntary sale, plaintiff could not -'It lr1 ar1sJil 
could it have been determined that the trade name "Al's 
c ,ting Goods" reflected his personal reputation and ~pOI . 
·hicl1 skill - ]Jave sold it voluntarily to a purchaser of the 
it bt sporting goods business to which it attached'. Such .a 
enct result, in that context, would be harsh, reducmg as it 
~d :rt ironld the sale price, and certainly - under the hypo-
tte1. thetical posed - would not have been contended for by 
t'cu1t +he plaintiff herein. Such a result would add uncertainty 
· the toerery sale of a retail trade name and business in Utah. 
wmt TJie }fassachusettes Supreme Judicial Court carefully 
it ii skirted this possibility, stating: "The case is not like 
her's ' those in which there is a sale of fixed property and a 
this local business to which the name belongs, and whose 
~l~ss principal features remain unchanged after the sale." 
~ m· This case, involving the assignment and sale for the 
~ted,: benefit of creditors of a retail outlet, whose features 
w~s 
1 
remained the same after the sale save for the change in 
igm ownership personnel, falls within the qualification speci-
fied in Messer. 
mod In swnmary, while the result in Messer was correct, 
·hicl1 the language upon which plaintiff must depend was 
1t, it unwarranted, has not been followed as precedent on 
onal slinilar facts and in fact has been cited for the very 
,em· point upon which the case should have been, but was 
I on not, decided. Even, however, the judicial panel which 
1inst d.ecided Messer would not have upheld plaintiff's posi-
con· hon herein for the case here is identified in Messer as 
· t on · h' JJil · e in w ich the trade name would have passed. 
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b. Even if the subject trade name could .. 
1
. 
• , Ui11.i: 
some circumstances, be held to be "per· 
1 801111 
despite its non-inclusion of plaintiff'" . 
"jlrr. 
sonal name, the undisputed facts compel ti;, 
conclusion that it was not" persorw.1" hereni 
Even were it held - contrary, defendants belier 
to the distinct mainstreams of authority -- that plainti; 
could assert that "Al's Sporting Goods," although 
1111 
containing his personal name, was "personal" to bin. 
the undisputed facts herein compel the conclusion,, 
a matter of law that it was nevertheless ''impersonal 
As has been noted in the next preceding secti1JLl. 
to be "personal" - even when continuing its owner1 
own naine - the trade name must have come to signifr. 
validly to the general public (not to just six or men 
isolated persons willing to testify) the skill of the owner: : 
That the signification must be valid and that it mm!i ; 
run to the general public is apparent. \Vere the belie! 1 
in skill invalid - e.g. were the skill of another, say an 1, 
employee, in fact involved - the owner could offer m 
public assurance that such skill would continue to~' 
represented by the name. Were the signification not Iii f, 
the general public, the chance of the public being misle~ n 
by the trade name's transfer would be nil, for the par· n 
ticularized public knows the individual and places in· rr 
dividual trust in him, not the trade name he has adoptta cl 
· 'ff' cl or acquired (as, patently, was the case with plamti ': 
seven "customer" witnesses - each of whom kne11 ti 
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Ii plaintiff as an individual and, prior to the termination 
,
11 
of his operation of "Al's" as Dick - Tr. 79-96). 
rr Based upon this test, even were the trade name here 
't under consideration "Dick's Sporting Goods," the evi-
111· dence conclusively demonstrates that the trade name 
1'1, 
would be impersonal. 
11 1. The trade name could not have come to signify 
11 ralidly to the general public plaintiff's skill in the selec-
r iion, production or care of goods. Plaintiff himself 
,, negated skill in the selection of goods. In answer to his 
counsel's question "was the merchandise carried by you 
tssentially merchandise that could be obtained at other 
Ll. locations!" plaintiff answered " (a) bsolutely" (Tr. 52) . 
1 Xo goods were produced, unless one considers produc-
1· hon incident to self-loading instruction, and that was 
n performed by his assistant manager (Tr. 151-52). Care 
r. of damaged merchandise was performed exclusively by 
.' others than plaintiff (Tr. 151). As to undamaged mer-
';\ chandise, plaintiff's quoted response to the effect that 
his merchandise essentially could be obtained at other 
locations again provides the answer. 
The public face of a retail establishment - its sales 
' force - had plaintiff as a part, but only as a part and 
no more important to the general public than other sales-
men. According to plaintiff, even when he was work-
!ngregularly as a salesman during busy periods he could 
· claim no more than that he "sold as much or more mer-
', chandise than any person in the store" (Tr. 168). Al-
though the percentage of the time that - prior to his 
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financial troubles - plaintiff spent in selling ma 
1 Y 1an 
been greater than during those troubles, it is clear that 
his "back room duties" seriously restricted his tirn , e r1,. 
the floor. As plaintiff stated, "you hire salesmen to 
1111 
the selling" (Tr. 167-69) . Plaintiff hired such salesme
11 
and they - as much as, indeed more than, plaintdf ~ 
were necessarily the public image of the establishment 
As submitted previously, the sale through the a,. 
signee of plaintiff's business assets herein meets tli 
~I esser test that the principal features of the busint1, 
to which the name belonged remain the same after tli 
sale save for the change in ownership personnel. In r'at 
one of plaintiff's major complaints at trial was ,1111; 
that: that, under defendants' operation, the busine1, 
was essentially unchanged (Tr. 54-57). 
On the record, then, the trade name was not ralidh- 1 
associated by the general public with any skill of plain· 
tiff. 
* * * 
The review of authorities herein contained dern· 
onstrates forcefully the divestiture by plaintiff's assign· v 
ment for the benefit of creditors of his business of Jui 
prior rights to the subject trade name. That divestiture c 
having been accomplished, plaintiff had no title on tl1t 
strength of which he could prevail, and the Trial Courti u 
judgment was in error. 
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n 
ti 
ban c. If plaintiff did not otherwise divest himself of the 
d m
e he did so by abandonment. 
that tra e na ' 
1e rir The Trial Court rendered neither findings nor con-
o rJ,, clusions on this subject, although it was one of the issues 
me11. set down for trial (R. 14). Such abandonment should 
~ - have been found, for beyond doubt the record herein 
ient demonstrates that plaintiff abandoned simultaneous with 
the closing of his business the trade name "Al's Sporting 
~a,. Goods.'' That record reveals "not only acts indicating 
th a practical abandonment, but an actual intent to aban-
nt1, don," j;2 Am. Jur., Trademarks, Tradenames and Trade 
· lli Practices § 30. 
Thus. on direct, plaintiff admitted to the "termi-
1111·, 
nation' of his business (Tr. 52). Thus, moreover, plain-
11e1, 
tiff declared to defendants that " (a) II I want to do is 
get out and be out of this pressure and leave this busi-
idh· ness'' - that he was "all through with this deal" (Tr . 
. am· 118): testimony which plaintiff did not rebut or other-
wise deny. In fact, plaintiff testified that - at the time 
.em· 
of the assignment to Inter Mountain - he "conveyed 
everything or gave everything to them that related to 
the business" (Tr. 61, emphasis supplied). In contacts 
1gu· 
Jui with defendants following the assignment he did not 
turr give present claim to ownership of the name, but rather, 
tlit conceded that it was no longer his (Tr. 64-65, 122-23). 
irfi Coupled with this was the abandonment of all business 
Incidentals - whether or not listed in the inventory and 
many bearing the subject trade name - by plaintiff at 
the business premises (Tr. 55, 68, 69, 160-63; Ex. 21-
25)' 
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This constituted an unexplained conces · 
• • SIO!i I: 
plambff that the name was no longer his It ,1.a · • · s onJ, 
after defendants commenced using the name as l 
1 
· , le ,, 
led them to believe they could do, that plaintiff assert• 
a present right therein; his abandonment, however, 
11
; 
effectual before that date. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANTS HAD, AT ALL TD!E~ 
COMPLAINED OF AND AT THE TIMEO! 
THE INJUNCTION HEREIN, TITLE Tr, 
THE TRADE NA.ME "AL'S SPORTn1 
GOODS." 
A. The sources of plaintiffs title. 
As noted heretofore, the Trial Court did not il! 
pose upon plaintiff the duty to prove his title to 11 
subject trade name. Rather, it contented itself \1J 
finding that defendants had not met the burden I 
Trial Court imposed of proving their title. Conclusion 
rejects defendants' title by reason of the bill of sale (fa 
9, 25) received in the name of Wolfe's Sportsman 
Headquarters. Conclusion 2 rejects defendants' titld: 
reason of the bill of sale (Ex. IO) received in the naw 
of Elliott Wolfe. Conclusion 3 is explicitly inseparaK 
from and dependent upon Conclusions I and 2, i.e. Hj 
"Al's Sporting Goods" was back in business was Olli 
leading in that title to such trade name had not pas)t. 
The other conclusions derive from the first three ri 
20-21). 
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ion 
11 
Although defendants contend herein that the Court 
as onl, . rlv shifted such burden, they also contend that unprope • . . 
he lia,. n the law applicable to the undisputed evidence -
-upo · · · t d f d ' ssert• the Trial Court's determmahons agams e en ants 
er, 
111 
title were erroneous. Such title was derived from one 
of three alternative sources: (I) the successful bid upon, 
and bill of sale received to, the fixtures and inventory 
in the name of vVolf e's Sportsman's Headquarters; 
( z) the bill of sale received in the name of Elliott Wolfe; 
Jm and ( 3) from adoption by user of the trade name by 
E 01 defendants following its abandonment either by (a) 
~ Tr: plaintiff, or (b) plaintiff's assignee, Inter Mountain 
TD1 Association of Credit Men. 
6. The Bills of Sale received in the respective names of 
Wolfe's Sportsman's Headquarters and Elliott Wolfe inured 
1ot il! to the benefit of all defendants. 
to 11 The Trial Court found, and there is no reason to 
f \l:i 
quarrel with its finding, that "upon acquiring the mer-
en f 
chandise, furniture and fixtures (of plaintiff's former 
JS!Oll b · ) usmess the defendants reopened plaintiff's place of 
e (fa b · usmess and continued doing business and holding 
;man· th l emse ves out to the public as "Al's Sporting Goods" 
itld: 
(R. 19-20). Such user of the trade name thus was by 
'nam the entire partnership, consisting of all defendants, 
1araoi 
pursuant to the bill of sale taken in the name of Wolfe's 
e. n~ s 
portsman's Headquarters and extant at the time of 
s Dlli 
the bill of sale taken in the name of Elliott vV olf e. 
1aS)t. 
~e ri No legal difficulty is occasioned by the fact that 
such bills of sale were each taken in the name of a partner 
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rather than of the partnership. Such muniments of tit] 
b . 1 . . . e St o v10us y pertam to matters w1tlun the scope of tlw ,
1 
partnership activity, i.e. a retail sporting goods busin . "
6 
That being the case, it is axiomatic that a parte~i. tr: 
r1er it 
(whether 'Volfe's or Wolfe) - legally debarred frorn' 
competing with the partnership of which he was a men1. 
her -- took whatever the bill of sale conveyed for tlit tr: 
benefit of the partnership, 40 Am. Jur., Partners/
1
;
11 
nc 
§ 132, and that equity will - if the named partner wrll JZ( 
not (which is not the case here) - impose a trust there· Cr 
on in the name of the entire partnership, Meinhard, 
Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928) - \'' 
another application of the maxim that "equity regar1I. 
as done that which ought to be done." 
Exhibits 9 and IO, therefore, lrnve precisely tm 
same effect herein as though they both explicitly nameu 
all defendants as grantees. 
C. The Bill of Sale to defendants of the tangible assets 
of "Al's Sporting Goods" effected the transfer of the tradi 
name to defendants. 
By bill of sale dated July 12, 1965, Inter l\fountam 
did "sell, transfer, set over and deliver" to defendant1 
"all furniture, fixtures and merchandise as per invento~· 
list attached hereto and made a part hereof" (Ex. 9 · 
It is fundamental to the law of trade names ano 
trademarks that they do not er:ist apart from the bmi· tra 
t d b. 'Ir fer ness with which the are connected. As sta e ~ · · 
. h U 't d State1 & Justice Sutherland, speakmg for t e Ill e 
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title ··eme Court in American Foundries v. Robertson, 
Sup1 ) "1'h . . ti . l'.:: 372 380 ( 1926 : ere is no property m a It 2utl .J. ' 
ie· d inark apart from the business or trade in which 
S) tra e-
t11er ,it is employed." 
ro1n 'fhe transfer of a business effects the transfer of its 
ien:· trade names and trademarks. A formal assignment is 
·\lie not necessary. The law in this respect is well summar-
·s/1111 ize<l in A nierican Dirigold Corp. v. Dirigold Metals 
\\ill Cuiporntion, 125 F.2d 446, 453 (6 Cir., 1942): 
iere· 
·d .. 
'\tie 
uneu 
asseti 
trade 
mtau1 
dant1 
nto~· 
x. 9,, 
"The rule of law is well recognized that in a 
roluntary sale of a business as an entirety, 
trademarks and trade names, which have been 
lawfully established and identified with such 
business, u:ill pass to one who purchases as a 
b.:hole the physical assets, or elements of the busi-
ness, even thonyh not specifically mentioned in 
the conveyance . ... 
"The law makes no distinction between 
voluntary and involuntary sales, and where the 
trademark involved is not in law a personal one 
and the transfer is made by operation of law 
through bankruptcy or a general assignment for 
the benefit of creditors, the courts have held that, 
although not specifically mentioned in the pro-
ceedings, the trademarks or trade names lawfully 
identified with the business pass to one who pur-
chases the business substantially as a whole." 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
s ana One effect of this dependence of a trade name or 
busi· trademark on a business is that neither can be trans-
1· ~Ir. !erred independent of such business. In Everett 0. Fisk· 
State1 & C0., Inc. "'. Fi's'· T h ' A I ..., tt eac er s gency, nc., supra, 
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a case arising in Colorado, the plaintiff and def d . ~~ 
orgamzers had a contract whereby the plaintiff f . 
consideration licensed the organizers to use the t~r' 
"F' k 'f h ' A " aai name is eac er s gency. The organizers r .1 epuu .. 
ated the contract, but continued to use the name i·1 
, \\']it[ 
they gave to the defendant corporation. The Circu.: 
refused to enforce the contract, stating at 3 F.2d S: 
"Th~ plaintiff's attempte? license of the rigli· 
to use its trade name was meffective, becau~e, 
trade name cannot be assigned, except as an uic: 
dent of the sale of the business and good ~;:: 
in connection with which it has been used." 
An identical holding by this Court, except tha: ·•• 
involves a trademark rather than a trade name, is foun1 
in Honey Milling Co. v. Salt Lake & JordanMill&Ell· 
vator Co .. , 58 Utah 149, 197 Pac. 731 (1921),inwhitl 
you stated at 58 Utah 155: "(A) trade mark is nu: 
transferable except in connection with some busine·1 
or enterprise in which it is used as such .... " 
The same rule is put succinctly in Browning Kim: 
Co. of N.Y. v. Browning J(ing Co., 176 F.2d 105, rn1 
( 3 Cir., 1949) : " ( T) rade marks and good will cannr 
be transferred in gross. They are an integral part ol 
business and go with a business." To the same effect,)~ 
American Broadcasting Co. v. Wahl Co., 121 F.2d II: ' 
( 2 Cir., 1941) ; Allegretti v. Allegretti Chocolate Creai 1 
Co., 177 Ill. 129, 52 N.E. 487 ( 1898) ; Wiscon.Yin Wnili 
1 
N W·~· I Lilly Butter Co. v. Safer, 182 Wis. 71, 195 · · 1 
1 
(1923). 
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idanf, 
· for 1_ 
· traa1 
'epuU: 
whilr 
8: 
In consequence, one may not sell his business to 
l uer and the trade name thereof to another buyer, one HI.' • , 
Ward-Chandler Bldr;. v. Cardwell, supra; Children s 
Bootery v. Sutker, supra. 
These cases have received the endorsement of the 
Restatement of Torts, § 755. 
For this reason, just as on the transfer by plaintiff 
~ rigl1· io Inter Mountain of the physical assets of the sporting 
ause, ~oods business he had previously conducted, the good 
n me:- c 
id ~;:: \\'ill of such business and the trade name Al's Sporting 
Goods were also tranferred (see Point I BI) - equally 
the sale of the tangible assets of the business to def en-
tha~ ·• dants bv Inter _l\Iountain to defendants carried with it 
founi such go~d will and trade name. To hold otherwise, would 
&Ell- be to hold that trade names or trademarks exist in-
whitl dependently and are severable in gross from the business 
15. nu: with which they are connected. 
1Slli1'• 
D. The Bill of Sale of the trade name received by defen-
K, dants in the name of Elliott Wolfe was part of the same trans-1m: 
5 
mi action as the sale of plaintiff's business assets to defendants 
' _ and, if such trade name did not pass with the assets, it passed 
:annr by such Bill of Sale. 
·t ol 
ct,)~ There can be no doubt that, if Inter Mountain re-
!dli: ceived the subject trade name by reason of plaintiff's 
)ea1 assignment, defendants and Inter Mountain intended 
W!il1 that such trade name be conveyed to the former by the 
i1. W latter. The bill of sale received in the name of Elliott 
Wolfe (Ex. IO) bespeaks that intention irrefutably. 
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Nor does such bill of sale constitute an attem 
1
, 
I t 1\.1 . . 1 . p bi ti n er ..Lf ountam to assign sue i name m gross an 1 · 
• • ' apar; n1 
from the assets of the busmess with which it wa . 
S tnp. C< 
nected. Those assets had also been sold to def end 
1 an, 0 
Even if the sale of assets did not - the authoritie~a·' \ 
Point II B notwithstanding - carry with it such narut 
Exhibit 10 was clearly a part of the self same transactiu: 
between Inter .Mountain and defendants. One cannry 
11 
be considered independently of the other. Both relat, 
3 
to the same subject matter - the assets and name tn2 
once were "Al's Sporting Goods" - and both we1, 
within an extremely restricted time range - spannini. 
as they did, only 16 days. 
Reading the two bills of sale (Ex. 9, IO) together. 
the intendment of the parties becomes clear. Inter Jlou11· 
tain, having received the business assets of "Al's Spor'.· 
ing Goods" including the name, intended to sell at 
such assets4 including such name to defendants. 
Such a reading together of documents arising ou1· 
of the same transaction is a requisite tool to proper con· 
struction. "A writing is interpreted as a whole. and a~ 
writings forming part of the same transaction are inter· 
preted together," Restatement of Contracts, § 235 (c). 
To the same effect are Patterson-Ballagh Corp.v.Byron 
Jackson Co., 145 F.2d 786 (9 Cir., 1944) andK1111 
v. U.S., 156 Fed. Supp. 99, aff'd 254 F.2d 8ll (19jii 
'Vhatever, then, the infirmity as a muniment o: 
4 The sole exception: an automobile which Inter Mountain~· 
ranged to sell to plaintiff's wife (Tr. 61, 133). 
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01 
. le to the trade name of the bill of sale of the assets -
tit h. fi . . 
1a1, and it is contended there was no s~c m rm1ty .- it was 
01 ·ted and its intendment clarified by the bill of sale 1· turret 
11t. of" Al'~ Sporting Goods" received in the name of Elliott 
; a \Y olfe. 
mt 
111 E. If defendants did not otherwise obtain title to the 
no: trade name, they did so by appropriation and use following 
a!1 abandonment either by plaintiff or by Inter Mountain. 
Im 
The original ownership of trade names, just as 
·er'. 
trademarks. is obtained by business user, 52 Am. Jur., 
ni. Trademarh:s, Tradenames and 1'rade Practices § 22 . 
• This was exclusively so at common law, and remains so 
ier today despite the enactment of "fictitious name" sta-
u11 lutes, Nielsen v. American Oil Co., 203 F.Supp. 473 
Jr:- (D. "Utah, 1962), and of federal trademark legislation, 
II 
at 8i C..J.S., Trade Marks, Trade Names, and Unfair 
Competition § 169 at p. 494. 
oui On the evidence, defendants' user of the name, 
on· ''Al's Sporting Goods" was patently sufficient to create 
a~ original ownership. They conducted a sporting goods 
ler· store, advertised and sold under that name. Plaintiff's 
'c). very complaint of infringement presupposes a user suf-
ro~ ficient, absent prior appropriation, to create ownership. 
111i: 
, Even if it be concluded that (I) defendants must 
ill· 
defend upon the strength of their title and ( 2) they have 
o: no title to the subject trade name by reason either of 
their purchase of the assets of the business to which it 
~· 
previously adhered, or of the bill of sale to them naming 
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such name, there still remains the question of .1 ,1 . • . , . \I Je1 II 
their user m itself created and constituted thei' t'· 
r 1!1.: 
The sole obstruction, if any, to such title by , 
in defendants is the prior ownership and user of then:'. 
by plaintiff, 52 A.m. Jur., Trademarks, Tradnamesar; 
Trade Practices § 26. If, however, the title created~: 
that prior user had been extinguished prior to or dur~·. 1 
defendants' user, such ownership no longer consbtur
1
• 1 
a bar. 
It is here submitted that defendants' busines~ ,
1
, J 
of the trade name, "A.l's Sporting Goods," created1ili' , 
thereto in them - if they had not otherwise receivea1r c 
from Inter Mountain - because the prior title, on11 ~ l 
held by plaintiff, had been extinguished either: (1) ~ .•• r 
plaintiff's abandonment of it or ( 2) through its abaq F 
donment by Inter Mountain after such assignee !ii u 
received the same. ti 
Plaintiff's abandonment, and the basis therefor,ij ii 
discussed at length at Point I C heretofore. That ~J p I Sl 
cussion was for the purpose of testing plaintiff's asm', 
a1 
tion of continued title to the trade name. Such aband@! 
ment is here noted not only for that purpose, but a~ 1 
for the purpose of demonstrating the strength of deff&I a 
dants' title for, because plaintiff so abandoned, def11,: ai 
• ·1., lo dants' title by user was not obstructed by the prwn, 
such abandoned ownership wo·uld otherwise have nai 
I 
If, however, plaintiff's assignment for the benefu! tr 
of creditors - as detailed at Point I B heretofore- tr. 
conveyed title to the assignee, and if such title was nl dt 
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'I f rred to defendants by such assignee - despite 
t
:ltl! tlrans etliorities cited in subdivisions •°and C of this 
1. .. tie au 
"' 
1
J · t ;tis the case that such failure to so transfer, 
11\ti Olll - • • . • • 
' :i:hile in the ·meantime selling the business assets assigned 
ia~ b d t nd t' · h f · ·i onstituted an a an onmen a ex znguzs ments o 
a·· t, c 
''· the trade name by the assignee which, in turn, obviated ~;; 1 the obstruction p~sed ~l/ such prior title to def end.ants' 
("quiJition of an identical trade name by user. Ult k 
The decision in point is Re J aysee Corset Co., 201 
1,1
, Fed. 779 ( S.D., N. Y., 1911). Therein, one Cohen owned 
rill.' a going business which acquired by user trademarks 
ill!' consisting of the word ''J aysee" and the letters "J.C." 
oni'!I He transferred the business to Corporation A, but did 
I)~ not explicitly assign to it the trademarks. Later, Cohen 
100q purported to assign to a third person the trademarks 
~ in gross. The third person then purported to assign them 
to Corporation B. At this juncture, Corporation A went 
., into bankruptcy. The trustee in bankruptcy, having dis-
or,, 
, di·' posed of the other assets of Corporation A, sought to 
I sell the trademarks in gross. Corporation B brought 
ism· 
d 
'
1 
action to enjoin that sale. 
l@, 
: ah 1 In an opinion reflective of many of the principles 
efe&\ applicable to this case, the Court held for Corporation B 
e/et1 and enjoined the trustee as prayed. It reasoned as fol-
ion'i lows: 
na~ 
(1) Cohen, by selling his business to Corporation A 
'I t f · enew, rans erred to 1t as a matter of law ownership of the 
re- trademarks, eYen though such marks were not specificallv 
1snr described in the transfer (Points I AI and II C). . 
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. ( 2) In that Corpor~tion A had already recent 
title to the marks, the tlurd party and hence Cor · 
. Bid 'If Cl"· po~.1 hon la no ht e rom o len. It !t ... obviouslq, 
that Cohen's conveyance of the trade-mark Ulla, . 
' CCuL 
panied by any business whatever, gave no title tu\ l 
assignee, and therefore none in any subsequent grant i 
tr. l 
(3) Corporation ll's sole right was therefore!, l 
user. "'Vhatever rights the present petitioner has in:, v 
trade-mark do not in any way depend upon C1JiJfri 
assignment but only upon the continued use thm 
in the petitioner's business." 
( 4) Corporation B's ownership created by userw· ti 
not subject to the prior title of the trustee throughC1.i b 
poration A through Cohen because the trustee hadav11 
doned the same by previously selling off the bu8illr·I 
assets independent of the trademarks, and tradeinari. 
cannot exist (no more than can trade names) abstrad. C 
and apart from such assets. "In due course of time,\~ 
. ar 
trustee sold the goods and chattels of the bankrupt, ri, th 
made no attempt to sell the good will of the bankru1:1 as 
business, nor the trademark .... The effect of. tu~ pl 
proceedings by the trustee was to kill the good will in. ar 
destroy the trademark .... " • ot 
J aysee Corset is directly in point here. If lnle1 ~ 
.Mountain did not sell the trade name, "Al's Spor~. ~1 
Goods," to defendants, then it sold plaintiff's busin,~j 
assets independent thereof. Such an independent~:; 
· . t' !'!Iii Of destroyed the trade name, which could not ex1s mg ·
1 
stit 
and defendants' right by adoption and business uilres 
44 
, .. · Corporation B's said right) was not obstructeu 
.1\t. uu~c as . 
h P
rior but abandoned title. 
lOt by t e ' 
Ir It should be marked that J aysee Corset stands for 
toL l oposition that such an abandonment does not cause 
, tie pr . . 
01 a rererter of title to the bankrupt or assignee for the 
iltr. benefit of creditors. Had that been the case, Corporation 
·er 1·il'ould haYe received the trademark back. Rather, it 
n:, was held the trademark had been "destroyed." 5 
i!f' * * * 
On the foregoing, not only did plaintiff not have 
title to the subject trade name at the time here pertinent, 
rw but in fact defendants did. 
(11 
a!~ 
CONCLUSION 
llftl1 
Aside from their errors of omission, the Trial 
rar1 
;: Court's Findings of Fact commit error only in one minor 
e,,~ and apparently inconsequential respect: they fail to note 
t,r'~. that Almer R. Peterson operated "Al's Sporting Goods" 
~:as a sole proprietorship prior to his partnership with 
ll 
plamtiff ('fr. l~). The Conclusions of Law and result-
a1. 
ant Decree of Injunction are, however, totally errone-
ous in that, for the reasons detailed in this brief, plaintiff 
1Dl11-
' 
1 Over the disclaimer of counsel for plaintiff, the Trial Court 
Dftlil• suggested durmg argument - although subsequently it neither 
. ~found nor concluded - that, assuming plaintiff's assignment iSlil~~t transfer the trade name to Inter Mountain, Inter Mountain's 
t la e of assets sans name might ca use such a reverter (Tr. 170-71). 
1 SUYhee Corset affords ;:i definitive ans\ver to foat suggestion. Any 
giW! Of cth r~verter from a~signor to assignee of a trade name. after sale 
I stitu•e us~ness to which such name appertained would itself con-
s u~' resu!{ a ransfer of a trade name in gross - an unallowable 
45 
had no title to the subject trade name on the streu 
of which he could recover, the Trial Court impro e~ 
shifted the burden of proof of title to defendant/a i 
- even in the perspective of that improper shift-iii 
was demonstrated in defendants. For those reasons,! 
Decree of Injunction should be reversed and remana 
to the Trial Court with a mandate to enter judgme 
for defendants on not only the injunctive issue, buta 
the reserved question of damages - which resen 
question becomes moot if the Decree is so rernsea 
its merits. 
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